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Abstract:  This paper analyzes short-run interfuel substitution between fossil fuels in West European
power generation. The problem is studied within a restricted translog cost model, which is estimated
by pooling time-series data across eight countries in West Europe. The empirical results indicate
that interfuel substitution in existing power plants is substantial, especially that between oil and gas.
This is consistent with the notion that short-run fuel substitution primarily occurs in multi-fuel fired
plants, by switching load between different single-fuel fired plants, or by some conversions of
electric plants to be able to burn alternate fuels as well.
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2Trends in energy demand are affected increasingly by the role of electricity and thus by the
fuel choices that are made for the generation of electric power. Consequently, electricity generation
will most likely be the focus of many policy initiatives aimed at altering the future fuel mix in
primary energy use. This is reinforced by the facts that power generation in general contributes
largely to global CO2 emissions; it is concentrated in relatively few and large facilities; and it
provides much more flexibility than most other energy uses (Dreyfus, 1991). Still, for policies
aimed at influencing fuel choice to become effective a thorough understanding of the factors that
determine fuel use is needed. In this paper we focus on the short-run fuel flexibility in the West
European power sector. The primary purpose of the paper is to estimate the degree of price-induced
interfuel substitution between fossil fuels in existing power plants in West Europe.
The derived demand for fossil fuels to be used in generating electricity normally accounts
for a relatively large share of total fuel consumption. Specifically, in 1993 the generation of electric
power accounted for 61% of the coal, 6% of the oil and 10% of the gas consumed in West Europe
as fuel (IEA, annual). Since electric utilities are large consumers of fossil fuels their responsiveness
to changes in relative fuel prices is important for the suppliers of fossil fuels (e.g., for production
and investment plans). For example, substantial short-term fuel switching enables power generators
to exploit price differentials in fuel prices, something that can give them increased negotiating
power. However, even if the capacity to switch between fuels (e.g., dual- or multi-fuel capacity)
exists, the opportunities for fuel switching may be limited for various reasons (see section 2); the
degree of actual short-run interfuel substitution therefore remains an empirical question.
The standard approach in previous research on interfuel substitution has been to study the
problem within a flexible cost function, in most cases the translog, and this is also the approach
employed in this paper. However, the present paper differs from many of the earlier studies on fuel
choice in power generation in two important respects. First, the degree of short-run interfuel
substitution is often (implicitly or explicitly) assumed to be zero in these earlier studies. In addition,
the few studies that do analyze short-run responses tend to focus their attention to the substitution
that occurs in dual- or multi-fuel power plants, and the data samples have been chosen accordingly.
1 Introduction
3In this paper we argue that there are at least two additional ways in which short-run fuel switching
can occur, namely through the switching of load between different single-fuel fired plants and by
converting plants to be able to burn alternate fuels as well (see further section 2). Second, most
previous studies analyze fuel choice in the US power sector (see section 3), probably due to the
availability of extensive data from the Federal Power Commission, while we in this paper focus
entirely on the West European power industry.1
One important limitation of the paper needs to be indicated before proceeding. Since the
prospects for short-run fuel switching form an essential part of this investigation, we only analyze
the degree of interfuel substitution among fossil fuels; coal, oil and gas. There are very few
substitution possibilities in the case of existing plants designed to utilize either uranium or
hydropower. It is therefore assumed that a country’s choice between hydropower and nuclear
energy is independent of the choice made between different fossil fuels to be burnt in electric plants.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the possibilities for and the
limits to short-run interfuel substitution in fossil-fueled power generation. In section 3 a critical
review of previous studies on the subject is provided, with a special emphasis on how the distinction
between short- and long-run substitution has been treated. Section 4 presents the theoretical
structure of the model employed in this paper. Here we specify a restricted (short-run) translog
model, which is estimated using pooled time series and country data for eight West European
countries. Section 5 discusses model estimation and data issues, while the empirical results are
reported and analyzed in section 6. Finally, section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
Electricity production is often assumed to be a so-called putty-clay technology. In principle,
this means that ex ante, i.e., prior to the construction of the plant, there is clearly the possibility for
substitution between all factors of production (including all fuel inputs). However, once the plant’s
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 Griffin (1977) and Ball and Loncar (1991) also look at the West European market. However, the former explicitly
analyzes long-run substitution for an early time period (1955-1969). The latter treats OECD Europe as an aggregate, and
no explicit consideration of the potential for short-run fuel substitution is taken (see also section 3).
2 Short-run Interfuel Substitution in Power Generation
4design is fixed in terms of a specific capital equipment, the scope for substitution is substantially
reduced. Thus, ex post the elasticity of substitution might be very low (or even zero). Since it is
common to assume that no interfuel substitution can occur in existing power plants we must
consider under which circumstances such substitution actually can take place.2
First, some electric utilities are able to use a variety of fuels and switch between them,
which gives some short-run flexibility. In dual- or multi-fuel fired plants switching can occur within
a day if the alternative fuel is available and no major modifications of the unit are needed; otherwise
it may take weeks or months.3 The amount of multi-fuel capacity differs considerably between West
European countries but has remained very high in some, and increased in many others. For
example, out of a 52 GW net increase in West Europe’s thermal capacity between 1974 and 1990,
43 GW (83%) was dual- or multi-fuel fired (IEA, annual). Second, there is also the flexibility
permitted by variations in the use of single-fuel capacity. A firm generally owns several generating
plants and units, which may burn different fuels. Since different units are brought on-line according
to their short-run variable costs of production, changes in fossil fuel prices can change the merit
order of plants using different fuels, thereby affecting the fuel mix in the short run. Third, some
conversions of electric plants are relatively straightforward and inexpensive. An oil-fired plant that
is converted to burn gas, or a coal to oil/gas conversion are examples of this. Accordingly, in
response to the oil crises in the 1970s, many West European utilities converted their oil-fired plants
to be able to burn gas or oil/gas (Söderholm, 1998a). The reversal, conversion from oil or gas to
coal-firing, however requires expensive investments and is therefore to be regarded as an
intermediate-term response (IEA, 1987). For example, the conversion of an oil-fired plant to coal
normally removes the plant from service for 1.5-2 years and costs about US$200 million for a 500
MW plant (Daniel, 1991; IEA, 1992).
Hence, even if the ex ante substitution possibilities are greater, there are still reasons why ex
post interfuel substitution might be important in the electricity industry. However, the opportunities
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 Fuss (1978) shows that the hypothesis of the existence of a putty-clay technology cannot be rejected for the electric
power industry in the USA. However, he only employs input demand functions for structures, equipment, fuel (treated
as an aggregate) and labor. Thus, no test of ex post interfuel substitution is undertaken.
3
 In some coal-fired plants, it is also possible to add oil to the pulverised coal input. This was the method used during
the British coal strike in 1984/85 when coal supply was limited (IEA, 1992).
5to switch fuels in the ways just described can be limited. The physical availability of fuels might be
restricted for various reasons or switching fuels might lead to a violation of the legal emission
limits. Moreover, fuel switching can also be constrained when long-term contracts are in force.4
Thus, multi-fuel capacity data reflect merely the technical capability for fuel switching rather than
the likelihood that the industry will actually switch to an alternate fuel for economic reasons. The
actual degree of price-induced ex post interfuel substitution therefore remains an empirical question.
Table 1 summarizes the methodological approach, data sample and short/long run
assumption for the most important earlier studies on fossil fuel choice in power generation.5
Substantial price-induced interfuel substitution has been found both ex ante and ex post. Still, the
distinction between short-run (ex post) and long-run (ex ante) substitution is often neglected in
previous research. For example, some of the alleged long-run models, e.g., Uri (1977) and Ball and
Loncar (1991), assume that electric utilities instantaneously move from one long-run (cost-
minimizing) equilibrium to another as relative prices change. Given the fact that fuel choice is
heavily connected to the choice of long-lasting capital equipment this assumption seems
unwarranted. In addition, many studies also assume weak separability between capital and fuel
inputs, thus unrealistically assuming that the mix of fuels used is independent of capital inputs (e.g.,
Griffin, 1977, Uri, 1977, Ball and Loncar, 1991, Ko, 1996). Normally the capital costs for different
fuel sources vary considerably, and with the advent of the combined cycle gas turbine, capital costs
for coal-fired plants are often double that of a gas-fired plant (NEA, 1992).
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 Still, the existence of long-term contracts is not a necessary condition for short-term fuel switching not to occur. For
example, in the mid-1980s Austria invested in two coal/gas-fired units with a combined capacity of 725 MW. These
units operate with a long-term contract for Polish hard coal. However the strategy has been to burn gas when found
cheaper and therefore occasionally stock coal (Baum, 1988).
5
 For a comprehensive review and a critical evaluation of previous econometric studies on interfuel substitution in
fossil-fueled power generation, see Söderholm (1998b).
3 A Critical Review of Previous Studies
6Table 1. Previous Research on Interfuel Substitution in Thermal Power Generation
Study Data and period
Short-/Long-
run estimates Method
Atkinson and
Halvorsen (1976)
Cross-section US plant data for 1972.
Multi-fuel plants only
Short-run Translog profit
function
Griffin (1977) Pooled international sample of twenty
OECD countries for five years intervals
(1955, 1960, 1965, 1969)
Intermediate
run/Long-run
Translog cost
function
Joskow and
Mishkin (1977)
67 new electric plants built between 1952
and 1965 in the USA
Long-run Conditional
logit model
Uri (1977) Pooled time-series data for nine US
regions 1952-74
Long-run Translog cost
function
Uri (1978) Monthly data for the aggregate USA
between January 1973 and December
1976
Short-run Translog cost
function
Haimor (1980) Pooled cross-section US plant data for
1970-1975. Multi-fuel plants only
Intermediate-
run
Translog cost
function
Mountain (1982) Pooled time series data for two Canadian
regions for the period 1964-75
Short-run Translog cost
function
Seifi and
McDonald (1986)
219 new electric plants built between 1955
and 1979 in the USA
Long-run Probit-logit
model and
translog cost
function
Bopp and Costello
(1990)
Monthly time-series data for five US
regions 1977-1987
Short-run Translog cost
function
Ball and Loncar
(1991)
Pooled time-series data for OECD Europe
1978-88
Short-run
Long-run
Translog cost
function
McDonnell (1991) Cross-section US plant data for 1987 Not stated Translog cost
function
Boontherawara
(1993)
179 new electric plants built between 1948
and 1985 in the USA
Long-run Conditional
logit model
Ko (1996) Compares two data sets, one based on
monthly US national data 1991-1993 and
one on 1993 cross-section data
Not stated Translog cost
function and
linear logit
model
7In short, many of the alleged long-run studies based on the translog cost function rely
heavily on interpretations made ex post, and not on explicit long-run formulations, in which
immediate adjustment is not assumed and in which the price of capital is included as one of the
independent variables.6 Perhaps more importantly, cost function approaches in general are based on
the assumption that firms minimize costs in their choice of factor inputs. Indeed, this is a brave
assumption since long-run fuel choices have been heavily influenced by government policies and
strong political overtones, whose aims have not always been cost minimization. Security of supply
policies, fuel use laws (such as the EC Directive in 1975 restricting gas use), public opinion and
environmental regulations provide some examples.7 The theoretical literature has focused a lot of
attention on the so-called Averch-Johnson effect. Basically this theory states that profit
maximization subject to a rate-of-return regulation results in a mix of factor inputs that would be
more capital intensive than would be the case under cost minimization (Averch and Johnson,
1962).8 Since such regulations have existed (and still exist) in many power industries the
assumption of cost minimizing utilities might be incorrect. However, a short-run model, in which
the capital stock is fixed, will not suffer from the Averch-Johnson effect, since the latter will not
distort interfuel substitution given fixed capital (Halvorsen, 1978). Finally, it should be noted that
the assumption of cost-minimization is not a testable restriction (but rather a maintained hypothesis)
in a standard cost function representation. An estimated cost function that is not well-behaved can
however cast doubt on the underlying structure of the model.9
Some researchers have taken the ambiguity about long-run cost functions seriously, and
therefore employ a quite separate, more ad hoc, approach in analyzing long-run responses. They
argue that, since fuel choice primarily is a matter of power technology choice, ex ante substitution
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 Some studies do not even consider whether their results should be regarded as short- or long-run responses. See, for
example, McDonell (1991) and Ko (1996).
7
 See Söderholm (1998a) for a review of the political and economic factors that have shaped fuel choice in West
European power generation since the 1960s.
8
 Of course, firms will minimize cost under a rate-of-return regulation if the regulatory constraint is not binding.
Whether the Averch-Johnson effect is a problem in energy demand research therefore remains an empirical issue.
9
 One deficiency of flexible cost functions is that they often are well-behaved (quasi-concave and monotonic) only for a
limited range of relative prices. Some researchers have therefore employed a linear logit model, which ensures
monotonicity for all data points. See, for example, Ko (1996) and Moody (1996) for electric power applications.
However, the input demands in a linear logit model do not correspond to any particular cost function and the model is in
this sense ad hoc (Considine, 1989).
8between fuels is preferably estimated in a conditional logit model in which there are a number of
discrete fuel choice options for new fossil fueled electric plants. Examples of this approach include
Joskow and Mishkin (1977), Seifi and McDonald (1986) and Boontherawara (1993). Thus, in these
models threshold effects are assumed to be important. Neoclassical cost functions, on the other
hand, assume smooth responses (along a continuous isoquant) to changes in relative prices.
However, this latter assumption of the cost function approach does not appear to be a major
problem. The choice of fossil fuels is no longer primarily a matter of discrete technology choices.
The prospects for reactivating large-scale projects have become severely limited during the last
twenty years, and as a result refurbishing and increased utilization of existing plants, as well as
conversions of plants to new fuels, soared in the 1980s. Uncertainty about future fuel prices, few
technical improvements in new plants, siting problems, innovations in information technology
(reducing the cost of maintenance) and stringent environmental regulations for new plants explain
this development (Ellerman, 1996, 1998). In other words, pure reliance on discrete choice models
will probably tell only parts of the entire fuel choice story.
If long-run substitution is not favorably investigated within a cost function approach,
analyzing short-run behavior with the help of a cost function appears more appropriate. We have
already mentioned that short-run models are ‘immune’ to the Averch-Johnson effect. Also, more or
less by definition, the built-in assumption that the choice of fuel responds instantly to changes in
annual fuel prices becomes more valid in a short-run model. Most countries also have some kind of
central production planning or a spot market for power, which both ensure that various power
supplies are dispatched based on their variable costs of production. In addition, the decisions to
switch fuels in existing multi- or single-fuel capacity or to convert existing plants to other fuels are
in general much less affected by governmental regulations and/or public opinion.
In other words, contrary to the ‘long-run’ models the theoretical foundations for estimating
short-run responses with the help of a flexible cost function tend to be relatively robust.
Nevertheless, if one is to measure short-run responses it is probably more appropriate to follow the
Marshallian tradition and explictly assume a variable cost function with fixed capital, rather than to
rely solely on the argument that time-series data alone will generate short-run behavior. Uri (1978)
9is an example of the latter approach while Atkinson and Halvorsen (1976), Haimor (1980)10,
Mountain (1982) and Bopp and Costello (1990) all treat capital as fixed in their models. Still, the
first two solely look at interfuel substitition in multi-fuel plants, and their data samples have been
chosen accordingly. The last two studies employs aggregate data (reflecting both single- and multi-
fired plants), but they never comment on how ex post substitution actually occurs. In this paper, we
have recognized three ways in which such substitution can take place, and the empirical results are
later confronted with these potentials. First, however, we specify the theoretical model to be used.
Duality theory implies that if producers minimize costs, there exists a dual cost function that
contains sufficient information to completely describe the production technology. In this paper we
follow the Marshallian tradition and assume the existence of a restricted dual cost function, in
which the capital input is fixed at a level other than its full-equilibrium value. In other words, we
presume that fossil-fueled power production technology can be represented by the following
variable cost function;
( )( )VC VC P P P P K P P Q tE C O G L M= , , , , , , , (1)
where VC is the variable cost of producing fossil fueled electricity. P P P PC O G L, , ,  and PM  are the
input prices of the respective factor inputs; coal, oil, gas, labor and material inputs. PE  is thus a
function that aggregates the different fossil fuel prices, that is an aggregate price index of energy
inputs. The input prices are assumed to be exogenously determined, i.e., we assume competitive
factor markets. The effects of technical changes are denoted by a time trend, t. Q and K denote
fossil-fueled electricity output and power generating capacities respectively. Thus, in this short-run
formulation the capital stock, K, is accounted for but changes in it are not explained.
Due to lack of reliable labor and material price data it is assumed that energy and capital
inputs are as a group weakly separable from labor and material inputs. Essentially this means that,
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 However, even if Haimor (1980) treats capital as fixed in his model, the pooled nature of his sample leads him to
4 The Restricted Translog Model
10
given fixed capital, the mix of fossil fuel inputs is assumed to be independent of the non-energy
inputs (labor and material). The weak separability assumption allows us to analyze a separate cost
function for the energy and capital inputs alone. We assume that the conditions hold for the
existence of an optimum cost function (VCE ) for fossil fueled electricity production of the
following general form;
( )VC VC P P P K Q tE E C O G= , , , , , (2)
For estimation purposes we are also interested in the cost-minimizing factor cost shares.
These can be derived by differentiating (2) logarithmically with respect to the fossil fuel prices, and
by applying Shephard’s lemma. This yields the following general cost share equations;
S
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for i = C, O, G
where Ei  represents power generation use of the ith fuel. Before these cost share equations can be
estimated we have to specify the cost function. The translog cost function was proposed by
Christensen et al. (1971, 1973) and differs from the earlier representations of producer behavior in
that it allows substitution between input factors to be unrestricted. It is obtained by a second-order
Taylor expansion of the logarithm of an arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function and is for our
purposes written as;
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interpret his estimates as intermediate rather than short-run responses.
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+ + + +
=
∑β δ β δK QK Ki
i
i tKK Q K K P t Kln ln ln ln ln ln
1
3
(4)
Differentiating (4) logarithmically and applying Shephard’s lemma yields three fuel share
equations as linear functions of the logarithms of the fuel prices and the other independent variables
so that;
S Q K P ti i Qi Ki ij j
j
ti= + + + +
=
∑α β β α δln ln ln
1
3
(5)
for i, j = C, O, G
The cost share equations in (5) form the basis of the empirical investigation. They allow us
not only to estimate the degree of price-induced fuel substitution, but since the parameters δ ti  also
appear in the cost share equations we are able to analyze in what way technical change affects fossil
fuel choice. A positive (negative) value of δ ti  indicates that technical changes over time have been
ith fuel using (saving). This study follows Matsukawa et al. (1993) who assume that ”the effects of
technical changes on interfuel substitution may be interpreted as the cumulative effect of fuel-
switching promotional policies on fossil fuels,” (p. 44). These policies include, for example, tax
deductions and favorable loans for utilities converting old oil-fired plants to coal burning. In other
words, it is reasonable to expect that the time trend in our case has been oil saving and coal using in
response to the oil crises in the 1970s, an expectation that is assessed empirically in the next section.
Several restrictions must be satisfied in order for the translog model to represent a well-
behaved cost function. The following parameter restrictions are imposed since the factor cost shares
must add to one and the cost function must be homogenous of degree one in prices;
α i
i=
∑ =
1
3
1
α α β β δij
i
ji
j
Qi
i
Ki
i
ti
i= = = = =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑= = = = =
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 (6)
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In addition, partial differentiation of (4) with respect to prices reveals the symmetry
condition α αij ji= . Finally, when using aggregate data it is common to assume constant returns to
scale (CRS) since it facilitates the separation of the impacts from technology, returns to scale and
capital. Brown and Christensen (1981) show that CRS requires that the following restrictions on the
share equations be imposed;11
β βQi Ki+ = 0 (7)
To obtain a measure of the degree of interfuel substitution we calculate the cross-price
elasticities of fuel demand. Following Uzawa (1962), Berndt and Wood (1975) show that, for the
translog model, the cross- and own-price elasticities are relatively simple to compute once the
parameters in equations (5) have been estimated. We have;
η
α
ij
ij i j
i
S S
S
i j= + ≠, and        η αii ii i i
i
S S
S
=
+ −2 (8)
for i, j = C, O, G
The own- and cross-price elasticities will differ at every data point, and normally they are
computed at the means of the data sample (assuming that this value is on the regression line). It is
important to note that these elasticities are only partial price elasticities, i.e., they account for the
substitution between the fossil fuels under the constraint that the aggregate quantity of fossil fuels
consumed remains constant. Also, the short-run elasticities are valid only for the levels of capital at
which they are evaluated, and they do not provide any information about the substitution between
capital equipment and the different fossil fuels. They do, however, permit the estimation of the
degree of interfuel substitution in existing power plants in West Europe.
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 The additional conditions for CRS that have to be imposed on the restricted translog cost function are also reviewed
in Brown and Christensen (1981).
13
In this paper the restricted translog model is estimated by pooling time-series data across
eight West European countries; Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and
the United Kingdom. For these annual time-series data between 1978 and 1995 have been collected,
except for the cases of Austria and Ireland for which data for the periods 1978-1994 and 1981-1995
respectively, only were found. This gives us a total sample of 140 observations.
The data needed to estimate the model include fossil fueled electricity production, installed
thermal power capacity, fossil fuel use in electricity production, and the prices for the three fossil
fuels. How these variables have been calculated, where they have been collected and other related
data issues are reviewed in Appendix 1.
In addition to the variables mentioned above, the dummy variables, DiSUK , and the
corresponding coefficients, γ iSUK , have been included in the share equations to capture the effects
of the UK coal strike in 1984/85, during which the British electricity sector had to substitute oil for
coal. A similar increase in oil utilization appeared in Ireland from 1985 to 1987 when the supply of
gas to the Irish Electricity Board ceased due to a conflict involving the gas supply companies (IEA,
1997). Accordingly, the dummy variables, DiSIR , and the coefficients, γ iSIR , have been appended to
the cost share equations as well. Finally, the data for Germany until 1990 only includes the former
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). However, after 1990 the data for the Eastern and Western
States are not separated. In this paper we handle the German unification by adding separate dummy
variables, DiTY (and the coefficients γ iTY ), taking the value of zero for Germany during 1978-1990
and one for the period 1991-1995.
In order to implement the translog fuel demand system empirically we need to specify the
stochastic framework. We desire a specification, which recognizes that variables not observed by
the econometrician still enter the different countries’ cost minimizing behavior. Specifically, here
an additive disturbance term (εitn ) is appended to each of the three cost share equations (where t and
n represent an index over the country-time observations). Further, we assume that each error term
can be decomposed into three elements so that;
5 Model Estimation and Data Issues
14
ε α µ ϕitn in it itn= + + (9)
where α in  is a country-specific error, µit  represents intra-equation inter-temporal effects by
following a first-order autoregressive processes (but it exhibits no error autocorrelation across
equations), and finally ϕitn , which is a term that may be contemporaneously correlated across
equations. The country-specific errors may be interpreted as unobserved fundamental differences
among the electricity systems in the eight countries (that still influence the countries’ fuel use
choices). We assume that these differences are fixed over time for a given country, and
consequently we are able to eliminate the country-specific disturbance component by introducing
dummy variables for each country. Thus, the following terms are appended to each cost share
equation;
γ in
n
nD
=
∑
1
7
 where Dn = 1 for country n and O otherwise (10)
This approach is normally referred to as the fixed-effects model, and it overcomes the bias
of the estimation results that can occur in the presence of unobserved country’s effects that are
correlated with the regressors (e.g., Friedlander et al., 1993). In addition, since cross-country data
normally tend to reflect long-run responses, the removal of all cross-country variance (and the
reliance on within-country variance) fits well with our purpose of only estimating short-run
responses. Furthermore, since cross-equation contemporaneous correlation of the ϕitn  terms is
expected, we assume that the resulting disturbance vector is multivariate normally distributed with
mean vector zero and constant (nonsingular) covariance matrix Ωtn .
The systems of share equations in the two models provide two seemingly unrelated
regression models that can be used to estimate the parameters of the models. The restrictions
suggested by economic theory must also be imposed to obtain efficient estimates of parameters and
elasticities. Further, the estimation of a full model, all three fuel share equations, would result in the
disturbance covariance matrix to be singular, thereby violating a necessary condition in the theory
of econometrics. To avoid this problem one of the fuel share equations can be dropped without loss
of generality. Since the system of equations was estimated by the method of maximum likelihood
15
(using the Time Series Processor (TSP) computer program) the results are invariant to the choice of
equation to be dropped (Berndt, 1991).
Parameter estimates and the corresponding t-statistics for the restricted translog model are
provided in Table 2. The results indicate that the model provides a relatively good fit in terms of the
t-statistics. In addition, conventional R-square measures for the share equations are between 0.89
and 0.90. The oil and coal share coefficients representing the UK coal strike have the expected signs
(coal saving and oil using), and are also statistically significant at the 1% level. The corresponding
is true for the coefficients representing the Irish gas disruption in the mid-1980s; these indicate that
this dispute had gas saving and oil using impacts on the country’s power sector. The size of the
capital stock is a notable determinant of fuel cost shares as well, a result that should be expected
given the high capital intensity of the electric power sector.
Further, the time trend coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs.
In other words, public policies directed towards the power sector appear to have been oil saving and
coal and gas using.12 The positive effect of public policies on gas demand is somewhat surprising,
especially since the EC Directive in 1975 restricted the use of gas in new power plants. However,
even if the EC Directive was revoked as late as in 1990, the Directive was relatively ineffective
much earlier, and many exceptions in it allowed combined cycle gas turbines to be built, often for
environmental reasons. Also, in the 1980s slow demand growth levels, and stringent regulations
limited the construction of all new power plants, and for these reasons utilities often find it optimal
to convert some of their oil-fired plants to be able to burn gas as well. Of course, the results
probably also reflect ‘pure’ technical changes in the design and performance of the combined cycle
gas plants. Most importantly, the thermodynamic conversion efficiencies of these plants were raised
substantially. Similar improvements did not occur in coal- or oil-fired plants.
                                                
12
 It should be noted that even after the oil price collapse in 1986, the restrictive policy towards oil, and in particular
towards oil use in base-load power, remained among the OECD countries (IEA, 1997).
6 Empirical Results and Discussion
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the Translog Model (absolute values of t-statistics in
parentheses)
Parameters Estimates Parameters Estimates Parameters Estimates
α C 8DV* βQC -0.312
(0.746)
γ CSUK -0.217
(3.027)
α O 8DV* βQO 0.302
(1.230)
γ OSUK 0.268
(4.750)
α G 8DV* β QG 0.010
(1.346)
γ GSUK -0.051
(0.922)
α CC 0.135
(4.071)
βKC 0.312
(4.687)
γ CSIR -0.009
(0.130)
α CO -0.059
(2.452)
βKO -0.302
(5.886)
γ OSIR 0.167
(3.053)
α CG -0.076
(3.066)
βKG -0.010
(0.205)
γ GSIR -0.158
(2.854)
α OO 0.039
(1.234)
δ tC 0.013
(7.612)
γ CTY -0.089
(1.749)
α OG 0.019
(0.705)
δ tO -0.018
(13.725)
γ OTY 0.131
(3.305)
α GG 0.056
(1.678)
δ tG 0.005
(4.264)
γ GTY -0.042
(1.049)
* 8DV indicates the use of separate dummy intercept variables for each country.
Before proceeding with the analysis it is necessary to establish whether the estimated short-
run translog system is well behaved or not. A cost function is well-behaved if it is concave in input
prices and if the fitted cost shares are strictly positive (implying monotonicity of costs with respect
to fuel prices). Monotonicity of the cost function was checked by determining if the fitted values of
the fuel cost shares were positive. The check of these showed that, except for eleven cases (of a
possible 420), the translog form generated positive cost shares. Further, concavity in input prices
requires that the bordered Hessian is negative semi-definite, and this was checked by examining the
signs of the principal minors at each observation. Apart from 22 observations (out of 140) the model
was well-behaved in terms of concavity. These results cast some amount of doubt on the validity of
the theoretical constrictions imposed on the proposed translog system.
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Table 3. Partial Short-Run Fuel Price Elasticities for the Translog Fuel Demand System*
Austria Belgium Germany Ireland Italy Holland Spain UK
ηCC –0.25 –0.21 –0.02 –0.23 0.17 –0.17 –0.17 –0.04
ηCO 0.05 0.10 –0.01 0.06 0.25 –0.12 0.24 0.10
ηCG 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.17 –0.42 0.29 –0.07 –0.06
ηGG –0.42 –0.53 –0.42 –0.42 –0.49 –0.28 0.14 0.45
ηGC 0.13 0.23 0.21 0.10 –0.34 0.10 –0.85 –1.11
ηGO 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.32 0.83 0.18 0.71 0.66
ηOO –0.59 –0.60 –0.22 –0.58 –0.24 –0.58 –0.54 –0.60
ηOC 0.06 0.26 –0.27 0.06 0.05 –0.18 0.43 0.45
ηOG 0.53 0.34 0.49 0.52 0.19 0.76 0.11 0.15
* The estimates that are in italics are those which have unexpected signs
.
In Table 3 the partial fossil fuel price elasticities are presented. All elasticity estimates have
been calculated at the mean value of the fitted cost shares over the period 1978 to 1995.13 Some
observations relating to the economics of fuel choice are worth commenting on. First, in general we
would expect the own-price elasticities of fuel demand to be non-positive, and the cross-price
elasticities to be non-negative (the latter since the three fuels ought to be substitutes).
This is true for a majority of the estimates (61 out of a total of 72). The most severe
deficiency of the model is that three of the own-price elasticities are positive (reflecting the failure
of the cost function to be concave in prices). Second, in the short-run it is likely that the base-loaded
(large cost share) fuel will exhibit a relatively low own-price elasticity of demand, while the
peaking fuels will be more price sensitive. This is a pattern that can be found in Table 3. Coal is
generally the base-loaded fuel in most West European countries analyzed in this paper (except in
Italy and the Netherlands), and the own-price elasticities for coal are also comparably low. It should
be noted that this result is not predetermined by the way the elasticities are measured. Specifically,
                                                
13
 Elasticity estimates in translog models are non-linear functions of the estimated parameters and cost shares, and this
makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the standard errors. Further, the usefulness of linear approximation
techniques is often very limited (e.g., Krinsky and Robb, 1986). For the above reasons, following many past studies, we
do not report standard errors for the partial elasticities.
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differentiating the partial own-price elasticities of fuel demand (ηii ) with respect to the fuel cost
shares ( Si ) yields the following expression;
∂η
∂
∂
∂
α αii
i i
ii i i
i
ii
iS S
S S
S S
=
+ −


 = −
2
21 (11)
It should be clear that the derivative in (11) can be both positive, negative or zero. Thus, the
relative size of the own-price elasticities are not given from the model specification itself. For an
empirical illustration, see Bopp and Costello (1990). It therefore does make sense to, ex post,
evaluate how meaningful the own-price elasticities are by comparing their size with the
corresponding cost shares.14
Third, Table 3 also reveals some evidence of price-induced interfuel substitution between
fossil fuels used for power generation, especially between the peaking fuels, oil and gas. It should
be noted that the simple method of including dummy intercept variables for each country in the
share equations, means that differences in price elasticities between countries exist only because
their respective fuel cost shares differ. A comparison of the size of the cross-price elasticities
between countries will therefore not be very informative. However, a comparison between different
cross-price responses over all countries can be useful. Such information is provided in Table 4.
In Table 4 the eight countries are treated as an aggregate, and it is shown that the magnitude
of the cross-price elasticities are fairly closely related to the corresponding shares of dual- and
multi-fuel capacity in the eight-country region. The substitution between oil and gas is the most
important, and the high share of capacity capable of switching between these two fuels provides one
explanation to this result. There are, though, two other, equally important rationalizations for the
high oil/gas-responses. First, in contrast to coal, both oil and gas are heavily used for peak power
production, thus increasing the possibility that changing fuel prices induce substitution between
single-fueled oil- and gas-fired power plants. Moreover, the relatively high oil/gas elasticities are
                                                
14
 In contrast, the reasonable result that, for a specific country, it is a change in the price of the base-loaded fuel that
causes the largest substitution with one of the that country’s peaking fuels (e.g., η ηCO OC< ), is a pure outcome of the
specific theoretical structure. It is easily seen by examining the cross-price elasticities in equation (8).
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also explained by the fact that conversions of oil-fired plants to be able to burn gas or oil/gas, often
are inexpensive and can be done within a relatively short time period. Following the oil crises in the
1970s, rather than building new coal-fired plants many West European electric utilities took
advantage of this opportunity. Similarly, some of the observed substitution between coal and gas is
probably due to some utilities converting their coal-fired plants to burn gas as well, for example, in
order to comply with SO2 regulations. Austria is one example where this has occurred.
Table 4. Shares of Multi-Fuel Capacity and Corresponding Cross-Price Elasticities in the
Eight West European Countries
% share of total thermal capacity in 1990
capable of switching between:
Partial Fuel Cross-Price
Elasticities**
Gas-Coal* Gas/Price of coal Coal/Price of gas
8 0.10 0.10
Oil-Coal* Oil/Price of coal Coal/Price of oil
17 0.16 0.10
Gas-Oil* Gas/Price of oil Oil/Price of gas
25 0.44 0.40
* Includes capacity that can switch between all three fuels.
** Calculated as averages over the eight different countries.
This paper has presented a framework within which interfuel substitution in existing thermal
power plants can be estimated. Overall the empirical investigation supports the views that short-run
fuel switching behavior is significant in West European power generation, and that this behavior
can be favorably analyzed with standard neoclassical factor demand theory. Our restricted translog
model reveals some sensible results about the economics of ex post fossil fuel choice. The results
are, for example, fairly consistent with the notion that short-run fuel substitution primarily occurs
(1) in multi-fuel fired plants; (2) by switching load between different single-fuel fired plants, and;
7 Concluding Remarks
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(3) by the conversion of electric plants to be able to burn alternate fuels as well. Notable evidence of
interfuel substitution is found, especially between oil and gas but also between the other fuel
combinations. This high flexibility in the West European power sector has most likely developed
during the last 25 years. Over this period the prospects for reactivating large-scale projects have
become limited, and as a result refurbishing as well as conversions of plants to additional fuels,
soared in the 1980s.
Short-term fuel switching enables power generators to exploit price differentials in fuel
prices. As a consequence, fuel suppliers face a ceiling on their fuel prices charged, and the prospects
for exploiting any market power become limited. Since the existence of multi-fuel plants limits
price increases for everyone in the electric power system, this also benefits generators who have no
short-run flexibility whatsoever. In addition, it is likely that the trend away from long-term contracts
between fuel suppliers and utilities towards annual negotiations (and spot purchases) is partly a
result of the increased flexibility in the power sector. Consequently, the production and investment
decisions of many fuel suppliers will have to be based more and more on current and future market
conditions rather than on ‘fixed’ negotiated prices. For this reason one can hypothesize that many
fuel producers try to diversify their ‘consumer portfolio’. Since electric utilities far way from the
well head or the mine site usually are marginal users that in turn are the most active fuel switchers,
such diversifications will be particularly important for fuel suppliers that are located far away from
the power generators.
Finally an important caveat; the results reported in this paper imply that in the aggregate,
short-run fuel substitution is significant in the West European power sector. Thus we do not show
that all power generators who can, actively switch between fossil fuels when relative prices change.
For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s many utilities converted their oil-fired plants to be able
to burn coal as well, and since then they have never burnt oil even if the ability still exists.
However, fuel switching capacity not only makes it possible to take advantage of price changes, but
it also improves the ability to respond to problems of fuel availability. In this sense the use of oil in
power generation provides an important source of energy security if disruptions in the supply of
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other fuels occur (IEA, 1995). This contrasts heavily with the attitude towards oil use only 20 years
ago.
The West European countries included in this study are those that use both coal, gas an oil in
power generation. Thus, countries like Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden are not included
because of their high reliance on nuclear and hydropower. Some countries also had to be excluded
because of substantial lack of fuel price data. These include, for example Denmark, France and
Greece.
Fossil fuel prices ( P P PC O G, , ) used in the study represent prices charged to electric utilities
in the respective countries. The prices are in US$ per toe and include any taxes or subsidies
charged. They have been collected from various issues of Energy Prices and Taxes (IEA, quarterly).
For some years these data were not reported, and in those cases fuel prices were assumed to follow
the same trend as the prices charged to the industrial sector as a whole. In those cases where these
industry-wide data were lacking as well, prices were assumed to follow the average CIF import
price to the country.
In Spain, however, for which data on coal prices from 1986 and onwards are lacking, the
latter approximation would probably be inappropriate. Most of the coal burnt in Spanish electricity
generation comes from domestic mines. Its price is determined by contractual negotiations between
UNESA, the association of electric utilities, and Carbunión, the organization of the coal producing
companies (IEA, 1996). However, the current contract (signed in 1986) applies a reference price for
underground coal based on the average price of coal sold to utilities in the four most important
member countries of the European Community. Opencast coal, on the other hand, is not subject to
long-term contracts but its price is calculated as a percentage of the price of underground coal
production (Couse, 1989). Accordingly, for our purposes coal prices for electricity generation in
Spain between 1986 and 1995 have been assumed to follow the same trend as the average price
charged to utilities in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK.
8 Appendix 1
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For the capital stock, the net maximum thermal electricity generating capacity (K) in
gigawatt (GW) has been used. Data on this variable can be found in the United Nations publications
Yearbook of World Energy Statistics and Annual Bulletin of Energy Statistics for Europe and North
America (United Nations, annual). For the early 1990s IEA’s Electricity Information has been used
(IEA, annual). Fuel input quantities ( E E EC O G, , ) have been measured in Mtoe and can be obtained
from IEA’s Energy Balances of OECD Countries for the years 1978 to 1989 (IEA, 1991, 1993). For
the remaining years the data for this variable were collected from Electricity Information (IEA,
annual). Total thermal electricity generated (Q), measured in terrawatt hours (TWh), was used as
the output variable. These data were collected from Energy Balances of OECD Countries (IEA,
1991, 1993) and Electricity Information IEA (annual).
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